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 14 
Paying High for Low Performance 
Steven A. Bank† & 
George S. Georgiev†† 
This Essay argues that regulatory reforms in the area of 
executive compensation introduced by the Dodd-Frank Act of 
2010 have not yet achieved their purpose of linking executive 
pay with company performance. The rule on shareholder say-
on-pay appears to have had limited success over the five proxy 
seasons since its adoption. The rule on pay ratio disclosure, 
adopted in August 2015, and the rules on pay-versus-
performance disclosure and the clawback of certain incentive 
compensation, proposed in April 2015 and July 2015, respec-
tively, are also unlikely to succeed. For the most part, the rules 
are intuitive and well-intentioned, but a closer look reveals that 
they are easy to manipulate, counterproductive, and often in-
teract with one another, and with other regulatory goals, in un-
intended ways. As a result, five years after the passage of 
Dodd-Frank, the decades-old goal of aligning pay with perfor-
mance remains elusive. 
  INTRODUCTION   
The heads of CBS, Discovery Communications, and Viacom 
had the distinction of being the three highest-paid American 
CEOs in 2014.1 At a cool $255 million, the media CEOs’ com-
bined payout looks impressive even when compared to Holly-
wood’s top-paid stars, Robert Downey, Jr., Dwayne Johnson, 
and Bradley Cooper, who together took in $172 million over a 
similar twelve-month period.2 These high figures might cause 
 
†  Paul Hastings Professor of Business Law, UCLA School of Law. 
†† Visiting Assistant Professor and Lowell Milken Institute for Business 
Law & Policy Fellow, UCLA School of Law. Copyright © 2016 by Steven A. 
Bank and George S. Georgiev. 
 1. Associated Press, Top 10 Highest-Paid CEOs in US, BOS. GLOBE (May 
26, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2015/05/26/top-highest-paid 
-ceos/uyTpy7DgYeXFYR7uKCh3LN/story.html (covering data for the year 
ending December 31, 2014). 
 2. Dorothy Pomerantz, Robert Downey Jr. Tops Forbes’ List of Top Earn-
ing Actors with $75m Take, FORBES (July 21, 2014), http://www.forbes 
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even Iron Man’s jaw to drop, but the real problem lies else-
where. While the actors are guaranteed to draw crowds to the 
box office, the stock of all three companies lagged behind the 
overall market by a large margin and even lost value for the 
year. 
Most would agree that CEOs should not receive outsized 
pay when their companies underperform. And yet, company 
boards, shareholders, and policymakers have been trying—and 
largely failing—to put this simple principle into effect for dec-
ades. After the recent financial crisis, the Dodd-Frank Act of 
2010 aimed to embed the “pay for performance” mantra firmly 
into federal law.3 Five years on, we find that the main result 
has been a thicker executive compensation rulebook, more 
complex pay structures, and a heavy compliance burden that is 
only set to increase as a result of major recent Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) initiatives. These include the con-
troversial pay ratio disclosure rule adopted by the SEC on Au-
gust 5, 2015,4 as well as proposed rules requiring additional 
pay-for-performance disclosure5 and the clawback of certain in-
centive-based executive compensation,6 which were released in 
April and July 2015, respectively.  
Unfortunately, the link between pay and performance is as 
elusive as ever. Turning back to Hollywood, the median pay of 
the CEOs of the eleven major media companies was $32.9 mil-
lion in 2014, by far the highest of any industry group in the 
S&P 500 index.7 At the same time, the median total return of 
those companies was only 10.8%—more than 20% lower than 
the S&P 500 average of 13.7%.8 The problem is not confined to 
the entertainment industry. A recent study found that firms 
 
.com/sites/dorothypomerantz/2014/07/21/robert-downey-jr-once-again-tops 
-forbes-list-of-top-earning-actors/ (covering data for the year ending June 1, 
2014). 
 3. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 4. See SEC Adopts Rule for Pay Ratio Disclosure, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-160.html.  
 5. See SEC Proposes Rules To Require Companies To Disclose the Rela-
tionship Between Executive Pay and a Company’s Financial Performance, U.S. 
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Apr. 29, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/ 
2015-78.html.  
 6. See SEC Proposes Rules Requiring Companies To Adopt Clawback 
Policies on Executive Compensation, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (July 1, 2015),  
http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-136.html  
 7. See Ross Kerber, U.S. Media CEOs Are Top Paid Even in Year When 
Stock Prices Lagged, REUTERS (May 12, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2015/05/12/us-ceo-compensation-media-insight-idUSKBN0NX0AV20150512. 
 8. Id. 
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headed by CEOs whose pay is in the top 10% in a given year 
subsequently suffer an 8% drop in stock value in each of the fol-
lowing three years.9 Indeed, an examination of the most recent 
developments relating to Dodd-Frank’s four most consequential 
executive compensation reforms—Say-on-Pay, Pay-Versus-
Performance disclosure, Pay Ratio disclosure, and Clawbacks—
reveals that the Act is proving to be just as ineffectual, coun-
terproductive, and easy to manipulate as prior efforts in this 
area.  
To be sure, Dodd-Frank’s reforms may be well-intentioned 
and even logical when viewed in isolation. But when imple-
mented within the complex regulatory domains of corporate 
governance and taxation, where economic actors have strong 
pecuniary incentives to find ways to undercut or evade the 
rules, the reforms add extra layers of complexity and expense 
for public companies, without getting us much closer to imple-
menting the pay for performance paradigm in practice. 
  SHAREHOLDER SAY-ON-PAY   
After decades of attempting to align pay with performance 
chiefly via enhanced corporate disclosure requirements, Con-
gress and the SEC changed tack in 2010 and sought help from 
firms’ shareholders via the new say-on-pay regime.10 The say-
on-pay requirement is Dodd-Frank’s most visible and innova-
tive pay-related provision. It requires companies to hold a 
shareholder vote on executive compensation and golden para-
chutes at least once every three years.11 The concept is intuitive 
enough. Shareholders stand to gain the most from strong cor-
porate performance, and they also stand to lose the most from 
oversized pay or poor performance. In theory, therefore, share-
holders should have a strong incentive to monitor executive 
compensation and corporate performance, and, if dissatisfied, 
 
 9. See Michael J. Cooper et al., Performance for Pay? The Relation Be-
tween CEO Incentive Compensation and Future Stock Price Performance 3–6, 
28 (Oct. 1, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=1572085 (concluding that the results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that (1) highly-paid CEOs are overconfident and therefore engage 
in suboptimal behavior and empire building, and (2) investors overreact to the 
incentive pay and then are subsequently disappointed by the company’s un-
derperformance).  
 10. See Dodd-Frank Act § 951, 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2012) (setting out the 
say-on-pay requirement); Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation, 
Dodd-Frank Act Release No. 33-9178 (Jan. 25, 2011), 76 Fed. Reg. 6010 (Feb. 
2, 2011), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-02-02/pdf/2011-1971.pdf (es-
tablishing the say-on-pay regime). 
 11. 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(a)(1)–(2).  
2016] PAYING HIGH FOR LOW PERFORMANCE 17 
 
to vote pay practices down. In reality, however, say-on-pay has 
not lived up to its promise. Shareholders are almost guaranteed 
to support existing pay arrangements: in each of the five proxy 
seasons between 2011 and 2015, less than 3% of all shareholder 
votes at Russell 3000 companies resulted in a rejection of cur-
rent executive compensation arrangements.12 This outcome is 
even more striking when considered alongside the fact that the 
largest proxy adviser, Institutional Shareholder Services, rec-
ommended a negative say-on-pay vote for 1214% of the com-
panies holding votes during these five years.13 
Even the rare rejection of a pay package can have little or 
no consequence, since Dodd-Frank made the shareholder votes 
merely advisory and non-binding; as such, boards are not re-
quired to abide by or even respond to them.14 Shareholder rejec-
tion of executive pay packages is not a factor in derivative liti-
gation either: courts have held that a negative say-on-pay vote 
does not help overcome the business judgment presumption at-
tached to a board’s decision on executive compensation.15 If an-
ything, the real impact of the say-on-pay regime has been con-
trary to the intent of regulators. According to one study, 
although companies reduce some aspects of pay in anticipation 
of the say-on-pay vote, they offset this by increasing other com-
ponents of the compensation package with the net effect of in-
creased overall pay.16 It is of no surprise, then, that even five 
years after say-on-pay was adopted, only one-fifth of investors 
believe CEO compensation is appropriate in size and struc-
ture.17 A similarly low percentage of investors have confidence 
that CEO pay is clearly linked to performance.18 Say-on-pay 
may have focused attention on the optics of compensation, but 
at the cost of increasing the complexity of pay packages and 
 
 12. See SEMLER BROSSY, 2015 SAY ON PAY RESULTS 2 (2015), http://www 
.semlerbrossy.com/wp-content/uploads/SBCG-2015-SOP-Report-2015-09-28 
.pdf.  
 13. Id. at 3. 
 14. See Dodd-Frank Act, § 951(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(c). 
 15. See Michael C. Holmes & Alithea Z. Sullivan, Say-on-Pay Lawsuits 
Losing Steam, LAW360 (July 10, 2012), http://www.law360.com/articles/ 
355799/say-on-pay-lawsuits-losing-steam. 
 16. Mathias Kronlund & Shastri Sandy, Does Shareholder Scrutiny Affect 
Executive Compensation? 36 (Nov. 20, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=2358696.  
 17. DAVID F. LARCKER ET AL., 2015 INVESTOR SURVEY: DECONSTRUCTING 
PROXY STATEMENTS – WHAT MATTERS TO INVESTORS 2 (2015), https://www.gsb 
.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/files/publication-pdf/cgri-survyey-2015-deconstructing 
-proxy-statements_0.pdf. 
 18. Id.  
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with little evidence that it has done anything to align pay and 
performance in meaningful ways. 
  “PAY-VERSUS-PERFORMANCE” DISCLOSURE 
PROPOSAL   
The SEC has been expanding the public company disclo-
sure requirements in the area of executive compensation at a 
steady, incremental rate since the 1990s.19 The goal of aligning 
executive pay with firm performance carries an enviable intel-
lectual pedigree20 and has been a constant thread in this wave 
of federal rulemaking. The proliferation of executive compensa-
tion disclosure rules and the attendant complexity in pay prac-
tices are illustrated by the length of the executive compensa-
tion section in the proxy statements of S&P 500 companies, 
which, by one estimate, has grown from an average of 5–10 
pages to 40–50 pages over this time period.21 The SEC’s rule 
proposal on “pay-versus-performance” disclosure, released in 
April 2015 pursuant to the requirements of Section 953(a) of 
Dodd-Frank, represents the latest and most explicit effort yet 
to establish observable and measurable links between execu-
tive pay and firm performance.22 
The pay-versus-performance disclosure rule would require 
companies to show the historical relationship between compen-
sation actually paid (CAP)23 to the CEO and to certain other 
senior executives, on the one hand, and total shareholder re-
turn (TSR)24 on the other. In addition, companies will be re-
 
 19. See, e.g., Kevin J. Murphy, The Politics of Pay: A Legislative History of 
Executive Compensation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EXECUTIVE PAY 14–17 
(Randall S. Thomas & Jennifer G. Hill eds., 2012). 
 20. See generally LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PER-
FORMANCE: THE UNFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004) 
(discussing board oversight of executive compensation and making recommen-
dations for how to improve compensation practices and corporate governance). 
 21. Joseph E. Bachelder, III, “Pay Versus Performance” Rule Proposed by 
SEC Under Dodd-Frank, HARV. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 
20, 2015), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/07/20/pay-versus-performance 
-rule-proposed-by-sec-under-dodd-frank/. 
 22. See Pay Versus Performance, Dodd-Frank Act Release No. 34-74835 
(proposed Apr. 29, 2015), 80 Fed. Reg. 26330 (May 7, 2015), https://www.gpo 
.gov/ fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-05-07/pdf/2015-10429.pdf.  
 23. The SEC proposed to define “executive compensation actually paid” as 
“total compensation as reported in the Summary Compensation Table modi-
fied to adjust the amounts included for pension benefits and equity awards.” 
Id. at 26337. 
 24. Under Item 201(e) of Regulation S-K, “total shareholder return” is 
“measured by dividing the sum of the cumulative amount of dividends for the 
measurement period, assuming dividend reinvestment, and the difference be-
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quired to compare their TSR with the average TSR of a peer 
group of companies.25 The SEC would require this information 
to be reported in a rigid tabular format, which is intended to 
increase transparency and comparability among companies.26 
The uniform presentation of the data, however, masks the fact 
that these metrics can be easily distorted by one-off events and 
that they incorporate decisions from different time periods. 
This could render historical and peer group comparisons use-
less or, even worse, misleading.  
For example, annual CAP for the CEO would be “doubled 
up” if a company changes CEOs midway through the year: the 
figure reported in the pay-versus-performance table would in-
clude additional one-off contractual payments such as sever-
ance to the departing CEO and a sign-on award to the new 
CEO. A company’s board may be replacing the CEO in an effort 
to align pay with performance, but the pay-versus-performance 
table would suggest the oppositethat the link between pay 
(CAP) and performance (TSR) is broken. In addition, the SEC’s 
methodology introduces a mismatch in time horizons. TSR is, 
by definition, measured over a one-year period; the CAP for the 
same year, however, includes compensation that was awarded 
in prior years for performance in those years, but was paid in 
the current year.27 This is a function of the unavoidable com-
plexity of modern pay practices, and capturing this complexity 
in a single figure such as CAP is impossible.  
What is more, TSR is a backwards-looking measure and is 
not useful in assessing how well a company is performing in ar-
eas that will determine its long-term value and success.28 It 
presupposes that all companies manage their affairs with a fo-
 
tween the registrant’s share price at the end and the beginning of the meas-
urement period; by the share price at the beginning of the measurement peri-
od.” 17 C.F.R. § 229.201 (2015). 
 25. See id. § 229.201(e)(i)–(ii).  
 26. See id. Of course, companies can choose to provide additional narra-
tive information clarifying the disclosures, so long as the additional disclosure 
is not presented with greater prominence than the required disclosure. Pay 
Versus Performance, 80 Fed. Reg. at 26334, 26355. While this could prevent 
misleading information, it does little to nothing to promote the comparability 
of information across companies.  
 27. See Ira Kay & Blaine Martin, Does the SEC’s New “Compensation Ac-
tually Paid” Help Shareholders?, HARV. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. 
(July 2, 2015), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/07/02/does-the-secs-new 
-compensation-actually-paid-help-shareholders/. 
 28. See, e.g., Joseph E. Bachelder, III, Targeting Total Shareholder Return 
Versus Creating Long-Term Value, N.Y. L. J. (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www 
.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202572707769/Targeting-Total-Shareholder 
-Return-Versus-Creating-LongTerm-Value.  
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cus on TSR and, indeed, it encourages them to do so.29 As a re-
sult, the pay-versus-performance rule disregards corporate 
strategy diversity and the fact that some boards may prioritize 
the interests of long-term shareholders over short-term share-
holders or that they may choose to take into account the inter-
ests of non-shareholder constituencies such as employees. Ul-
timately, both the “pay” and “performance” in “pay-versus-
performance” are simply too complex as concepts to fit comfort-
ably within the table required by the SEC’s proposed disclosure 
rule. 
  PAY RATIO DISCLOSURE RULE   
The desire to reduce complex concepts and relationships to 
single data points is also on display in the new pay ratio disclo-
sure rule adopted by the SEC on August 5, 2015.30 The rule, re-
quired under Section 953(b) of Dodd-Frank, calls for companies 
to calculate and disclose the ratio between the CEO’s total 
compensation and the median total compensation for all other 
company employees. It appears that, at least in part, the ani-
mating force behind the rule was a concern about growing in-
come inequality: by one estimate, the average ratio of CEO pay 
to median worker pay in American companies has risen from 
an average of 20:1 in 1965 to 303:1 in 2014.31 Congress, howev-
er, inserted the rule in Dodd-Frank, a statute seeking to ad-
dress the root causes of the 2008 financial crisis, andas 
shown belowthe SEC ultimately justified the rule as part of 
its pay-for-performance regulatory scheme.  
Dodd-Frank’s provision requiring pay ratio disclosure be-
came controversial shortly after the Act’s inception. The provi-
sion was a last-minute addition to the law that was not exam-
ined by the relevant congressional committees.32 The SEC’s 
proposing release, issued in September 2013, expressed initial 
 
 29. See id.  
 30. Pay Ratio Disclosure, Dodd-Frank Act Release No. 33-9877 (Aug. 4, 
2015), 80 Fed. Reg. 50104 (Aug. 18, 2015), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR 
-2015-08-18/pdf/2015-19600.pdf; see SEC Adopts Rule for Pay Ratio Disclosure, 
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
pressrelease/2015-160.html. 
 31. Lawrence Mishel & Alyssa Davis, Top CEOs Make 300 Times More 
than Typical Workers, ECON. POL’Y INST. (June 21, 2015), http://www.epi 
.org/publication/top-ceos-make-300-times-more-than-workers-pay-growth 
-surpasses-market-gains-and-the-rest-of-the-0-1-percent. 
 32. See Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Simple Solution That Made a Hard 
Problem More Difficult, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes 
.com/2013/08/27/a-simple-solution-that-made-a-hard-problem-more-difficult/. 
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skepticism about the rule’s rationale under the federal securi-
ties laws.33 Industry lobby groups raised multiple concerns 
about the feasibility of the rule and estimated annual compli-
ance costs at $710 million.34 Interestingly, this number was 
topped by the SEC’s own estimate for initial compliance costs 
in the adopting release, which came at up to $1.1 billion.35 Pop-
ular support for adopting the rule was high, however, and the 
SEC received more than 287,000 comment letters.36 The vast 
majority were supportive of the rule, even though a number 
came from form letter campaigns organized by the AFL-CIO 
and other labor organizations.37 The SEC was caught in a polit-
ical crossfire, with one side pushing for a repeal of the rule as 
part of a Dodd-Frank “fixer” bill,38 while the other advocated for 
its speedy adoption.39 The repeal efforts continue even after 
adoption and there have also been calls for challenging the rule 
in court.40 
Whatever the future fate of the rule, it represents yet an-
other case study of the limited effectiveness and the substantial 
evasion potential of legislation in this area. Retreating some-
what from its earlier skepticism about the rule’s place under 
 
 33. Pay Ratio Disclosure, Dodd-Frank Act Release No. 33-9452 (proposed 
Sept. 18, 2013), 78 Fed. Reg. 60560, 60582 (Oct. 1, 2013), https://www.gpo.gov/ 
fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-10-01/pdf/2013-23073.pdf (“[N]either the statute nor the 
related legislative history directly states the objectives or intended benefits of 
the provision or a specific market failure, if any, that is intended to be reme-
died.”). 
 34. CTR. FOR CAPITAL MKT. COMPETITIVENESS, THE EGREGIOUS COST OF 
THE SEC’S PAY RATIO DISCLOSURE REGULATION 8 (May, 2014), http://www 
.centerforcapitalmarkets.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Egregious-Cost-of 
-Pay-Ratio-5.14.pdf (reporting that, based on a survey of covered companies, 
the annual compliance cost for the rule is estimated to be $710.9 million). 
 35. See Pay Ratio Disclosure, 80 Fed. Reg. at 50156. 
 36. See Comments on Pay Ratio Disclosure, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-13/s70713.shtml (last modified Aug. 5, 
2015). 
 37. See id.; see also Richard Trumka, Investors Should Know Pay Gap Be-
tween C.E.O.s and Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2015), http://dealbook.nytimes 
.com/2015/02/09/investors-should-know-pay-gap-between-c-e-o-s-and-workers/ 
(explaining the AFL-CIO’s position on the regulation). 
 38. See Burdensome Data Collection Relief Act, H.R. 414, 114th Cong. 
(2015), https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/414. 
 39. See, e.g., Kim Chipman, Clinton Says ‘No Excuse’ Dodd-Frank Pay 
Rules Not Out Yet, BLOOMBERG (July 24, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
politics/articles/2015-07-24/clinton-says-no-excuse-dodd-frank-pay-rules-not 
-out-yet. 
 40. See, e.g., Victoria McGrane & Joann S. Lublin, SEC Approval of Pay-
Gap Rule Sparks Concerns, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/sec-set-to-approve-final-ceo-pay-ratio-rule-1438783961.  
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the securities laws,41 the SEC emphasized the rule’s relevance 
for pay-for-performance policies. Under this view, the infor-
mation provided by the rule would serve to inform shareholders 
when casting say-on-pay votes.42 Given shareholders’ limited 
interest in challenging executive compensation practices 
through say-on-pay, however, it seems unlikely that this addi-
tional data point will cause the majority of shareholders to be-
come more involved. What is more, the rule could be gamed in 
particularly damaging ways. For example, companies can make 
their pay ratio look better by cutting the lowest-paid workers 
from the payroll via outsourcing, without making any changes 
to CEO pay.43  
Many of the original concerns about the rule centered 
around the arithmetic and logistical difficulties in making cal-
culations about “median worker pay” by multinational corpora-
tions with thousands of employees and far-flung operations. In 
formulating the final rule, the SEC went to some lengths to 
provide companies with methodological flexibility in calculating 
the ratio, and also allowed companies to exempt a limited 
number of workers from the calculation.44 Although “carefully 
tailored to address implementation concerns,”45 this flexibility 
comes at a direct cost to data comparability. If each company is 
allowed to use its own methodology and exclude certain work-
ers when calculating the rule, comparing ratios among compa-
nies would convey little meaningful information, and could be 
misleading. This concern is further compounded by the fact 
 
 41. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 42. See Pay Ratio Disclosure, Dodd-Frank Act Release No. 33-9877 (Aug. 
4, 2015), 80 Fed. Reg. 50104, 50106 (Aug. 18, 2015) (stating that the rule fits 
with the general purpose of other Dodd-Frank executive compensation provi-
sions intended to further facilitate “shareholder engagement with executive 
compensation,” that Congress intended for the rule to “supplement the execu-
tive compensation information available to shareholders,” and that the rule 
“provides new data points that shareholders may find relevant and useful 
when exercising their [say-on-pay] voting rights”). 
 43. Andrew Ross Sorkin, S.E.C. Has Yet To Set Rule on Tricky Ratio of 
C.E.O.’s Pay to Workers’, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2015), http://dealbook.nytimes 
.com/2015/01/26/tricky-ratio-of-chief-executives-pay-to-workers/. 
 44. For example, companies can (1) select their methodology for identify-
ing median employees and their compensation, including through statistical 
sampling of the employee population or other reasonable methods; (2) make 
the median employee determination only once every three years; (3) exclude 
non-U.S. employees from countries where data privacy laws or regulations 
make them unable to comply with the rule; and (4) exclude up to 5% of all non-
U.S. employees. See Pay Ratio Disclosure, 80 Fed. Reg. at 50107. 
 45. Kara M. Stein, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement on Pay 
Ratio Disclosure (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/statement/statement 
-on-pay-ratio-disclosure.html.  
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that the ratio does not take into account the varied timing of 
deferred compensation payments, or the accrued value of pen-
sions and other retirement assets.46 
In light of the methodological issues with making the ratio 
comparable across firms and the scope for gaming the rule, pay 
ratio disclosures would appear to have limited utility within 
the federal corporate governance system. These same concerns 
would caution against initiatives, already underway, to use 
firms’ pay ratio data for other regulatory purposes, including 
granting preferences in state contracting or taxation to firms 
with low CEO-to-median worker pay ratios.47 
  PROPOSAL ON THE CLAWBACK OF INCENTIVE-BASED 
COMPENSATION   
The SEC’s rule on the clawback of incentive-based compen-
sation, proposed on July 1, 2015,48 represents yet another re-
cent federal intervention in the area of executive compensation. 
Perhaps recognizing the limits of disclosure as a regulatory 
strategy, this rule turns to much more aggressive legal ap-
proaches such as restitution and the use of strict liability. Just 
like say-on-pay votes, pay-versus-performance disclosure, and 
pay ratio disclosure, the clawback rule is unlikely to align ex-
ecutive pay with corporate performance; even worse, however, 
the clawback rule may actually undermine the very founda-
tions of the executive compensation regulatory edifice that the 
SEC has been designing since the 1990s.  
Under the proposed rule, which is mandated by Section 
954 of Dodd-Frank,49 companies would be required to adopt pol-
icies for the clawback of “erroneously awarded” incentive-based 
compensation when there has been an accounting restatement 
 
 46. See Pay Ratio Disclosure, 80 Fed. Reg. at 50104. 
 47. In Rhode Island, a proposed bill would give preference in state con-
tracts to companies where the CEO’s pay is no more than 25 times the median 
worker pay. See Gretchen Morgenson, Why Putting a Number to C.E.O. Pay 
Might Bring Change, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/08/09/business/why-putting-a-number-to-ceo-pay-might-bring-change 
.html (citing S. 257, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2015)). In California, 
a proposed bill would require that firms with higher CEO-worker pay gaps pay 
state corporate tax at a higher rate. See id. (citing S. 1372, 2013–2014 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2014)).  
 48. See Listing Standards for Recovery of Erroneously Awarded Compen-
sation, Dodd-Frank Act Release No. 33-9861 (July 1, 2015), 80 Fed. Reg. 41144 
(proposed July 14, 2015) [hereinafter “SEC Clawback Proposing Release”], 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-07-14/pdf/2015-16613.pdf.  
 49. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-4 (2015).  
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to correct a material error.50 “Erroneously awarded” is a refer-
ence to the fact that only compensation that was in some way 
linked to the restated financial statements would be subject to 
clawback.51 This seems logical enough, but the rule is overbroad 
in a number of other ways. It covers payments not just to the 
CEO and CFO, but to a large class of executives, including the 
principal accounting officer, any vice-president in charge of a 
principal business unit, division or function, and any other per-
son who “performs a policy-making function for the [compa-
ny].”52 Moreover, the rule covers compensation paid over a 
three-year period to both current and former executives.53 And, 
once triggered by a restatement, clawbacks are automatic for 
all covered payments to all covered executives, irrespective of 
whether fraud occurred or who was at fault.54 To fully illustrate 
the expansive nature of the new clawback rule, it is useful to 
contrast it with the existing clawback rule under the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002: the latter is enforced only by the SEC and on 
a discretionary basis, can only be triggered by actual wrongdo-
ing or corporate fraud (as opposed to merely a restatement), 
and only covers compensation paid to a company’s CEO and 
CFO.55 
The far-reaching new clawback requirements will certainly 
capture the attention of executives, boards, legal advisers, and 
executive compensation consultants. But this attention is un-
likely to result in better company management. The best case 
scenario is that the requirements will lead executives to spend 
large amounts of money ensuring technical compliance with the 
complex accounting rules. To be sure, restatements are evi-
dence of earnings manipulation, and earnings manipulation 
 
 50. SEC Clawback Proposing Release, 80 Fed. Reg. at 41147 passim. 
 51. Id. at 41154.  
 52. Id. at 41153, 41193. 
 53. Id. at 41145 passim; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78j-4(b)(2) (providing that 
recovery of incentive-based compensation applies to compensation received 
during a “3-year period preceding the date on which the issuer is required to 
prepare an accounting restatement”). 
 54. The proposal contains a very limited “impracticability” exception. SEC 
Clawback Proposing Release, 80 Fed. Reg. at 41192 (“Recovery would be im-
practicable only if the direct expense paid to a third party to assist in enforc-
ing the policy would exceed the amount to be recovered, or if recovery would 
violate home country law.”). Before concluding that recovery would be imprac-
ticable, firms must first attempt recovery or, in the case of foreign companies, 
obtain a legal opinion that recovery would result in a violation of home coun-
try laws. Id.  
 55. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 304, 116 Stat. 
778 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2012)). 
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remains a pervasive problem.56 There is little to suggest, how-
ever, that the proposed clawback rule will address this prob-
lem; instead it is likely to have a variety of undesirable effects.  
For example, the clawback rule may actually motivate ex-
ecutives to push for opportunistic changes in their compensa-
tion or in the operation of the company. One easy way to game 
the rules would be to restructure pay packages, so they contain 
more fixed salary and less incentive compensation. Even if 
fixed salary turns out to be unattractive for tax reasons or be-
cause the company wants to retain some form of incentives to 
motivate employees,57 executives could avoid clawbacks if their 
incentive pay is determined by the board based on a general as-
sessment of performance,58 or if it is tied to metrics not found in 
the company’s financial statements, such as opening a specified 
number of stores, obtaining regulatory approvals, or completing 
a merger, divestiture, restructuring, or financing transaction.59 
These performance metrics may be less clearly connected to the 
financial performance of the company or its stock than current 
incentive pay. Stated simply, if boards want to circumvent the 
rules, or if executives have enough bargaining power to require 
clawback-free compensation, the clawback rule can be evaded 
in its entirety by decoupling pay and performance. Therefore, 
instead of strengthening the link between the two by limiting 
manipulation designed to achieve performance goals, the claw-
back provisionshowever well-intentionedmight actually 
serve to sever the link altogether.  
The new SEC clawback rule may be counterproductive in 
other ways too. One study of firms that had voluntarily adopted 
clawbacks after the Enron and WorldCom scandals in the early 
2000s found that the provisions induced companies to make 
opportunistic operational changes and focus on the short term 
 
 56. See Simi Kedia et al., Evidence on Contagion in Earnings Manage-
ment, 90 ACCT. REV. 2337, 2368 (2015) (documenting earnings management by 
firms and associated earnings restatements). 
 57. Executive compensation for any “covered employee” (defined as the 
chief executive officer and/or any of the next four most highly compensated 
employees) beyond $1 million is non-deductible, if it is not performance-based. 
26 U.S.C. § 162(m) (2012). 
 58. This would apply to those executives who are not covered employees 
under Section 162(m) or who earn less than $1 million in compensation. 
 59. The SEC itself has acknowledged that compensation tied solely to 
such metrics would not lead to clawbacks. See SEC Clawback Proposing Re-
lease, Dodd-Frank Act Release No. 33-9861 (July 1, 2015), 80 Fed. Reg. 41144, 
41156 (July 14, 2015), https:// www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-07-14/pdf/2015 
-16613.pdf. 
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at the expense of research and development.60 This study found 
that any spike in profitability from such measures was re-
versed within three years, suggesting that the changes were 
just a big suboptimal shell game designed to evade the claw-
backs.61 Given that there is little evidence that voluntary claw-
back plans have done much to align pay with performance or 
stem the tide of rising executive compensation,62 it hardly 
seems worth it to mandate them. Moreover, the new mandatory 
rules are likely to escalate the cost of errors in financial state-
ments which might lead companies to seek additional assur-
ances when faced with difficult accounting judgments. Because 
of executives’ desire for certainty, audits may thus become 
lengthier which would delay the flow of information to inves-
tors and markets. Contributing to the compliance burden even 
further, in order to ensure that clawbacks are legal and en-
forceable under the terms of their corporate contracts and 
foundational documents, companies would need to review and 
potentially amend their bylaw provisions, indemnification pro-
visions, compensation committee charters, and other relevant 
policies.63 
In addition to pay for performance, the clawback rules may 
interfere with other regulatory goals, such as the promotion of 
capital formation. The rules would apply to all companies listed 
on U.S. exchanges, including foreign companies (known as “for-
eign private issuers”) as well as two categories of small public 
U.S. companies (“emerging growth companies” and “smaller re-
porting companies”).64 The SEC has traditionally allowed for-
eign private issuers to follow their home country rules on exec-
utive compensation and corporate governance in lieu of the 
U.S. federal rules.65 The fairly exceptional application of claw-
 
 60. Lilian H. Chan et al., Substitution Between Real and Accruals-Based 
Earnings Management After Voluntary Adoption of Compensation Clawback 
Provisions, 90 ACCT. REV. 147, 169–70 (2015). 
 61. Id. 
 62. See, e.g., Jesse Fried & Nitzan Shilon, Excess-Pay Clawbacks, 36 J. 
CORP. L. 721, 737–42 (2011).  
 63. G. William Tysse et al., SEC Proposes Broadened Executive Compen-
sation “Clawback” Rules, MCGUIREWOODS (July 2, 2015), https://www 
.mcguirewoods.com/Client-Resources/Alerts/2015/7/SEC-Proposes-Broadened 
-Executive-Compensation-Clawback-Rules.aspx. 
 64. SEC Clawback Proposing Release, Dodd-Frank Act Release No. 33-
9861 (July 1, 2015), 80 Fed. Reg. 41144, 41172, 41185 (July 14, 2015). 
 65. See, e.g., Assessing the U.S. Capital Markets—A Brief Overview for 
Foreign Private Issuers, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Feb. 13, 2013), https:// 
www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/internatl/foreign-private-issuers-overview 
.shtml.  
2016] PAYING HIGH FOR LOW PERFORMANCE 27 
 
backs to foreign private issuers may create incentives for these 
companies to delist from U.S. exchanges and rely solely on 
their home market listing, or to decide against listing in the 
U.S. in the first place.66 In fact, many non-U.S. companies did 
just that when they were faced with complex new corporate 
governance rules under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the wake of 
the Enron and WorldCom scandals.67 Studies show that a U.S. 
listing confers advantages on non-U.S. companies,68 but the 
burden from the new clawback rules may well outweigh these 
advantages, especially at a time when international markets 
are becoming increasingly competitive.69 Similar to foreign 
companies, small public U.S. companies have also traditionally 
benefitted from certain exemptions from executive compensa-
tion and corporate governance regulation. The application of 
the clawback rules to small public companies raises their com-
pliance costs and could discourage them from going public in 
the first place. This, in turn, could have a negative effect on 
capital formation, one of the core goals of the federal securities 
laws.70 
  CONCLUSION   
Over the past twenty-five years, the domains of executive 
compensation and corporate governance have provided numer-
ous targets for regulation due to largely legitimate concerns 
over cases of inflated pay packages, corporate underperfor-
mance, and corporate malfeasance. The track record of these 
regulations, however, is mixed at best, and, five years on, the 
reforms required under Dodd-Frank look like no exception. By 
introducing substantial additional complexity into the system, 
Dodd-Frank’s requirements not only create opportunities for 
evasion but also interact with one another, and with other reg-
 
 66. Foreign private issuers can avoid the requirement only if it violates 
their home country laws. See supra note 54. 
 67. Xi Li, An Examination of the Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on 
Cross-Listed Foreign Private Issuers and the Legal Bonding Hypothesis 28–33 
(Mar. 5, 2011) (2d Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper), http://  
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=952433 (documenting the nega-
tive long-term impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on U.S. listings by foreign private is-
suers). 
 68. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of 
Cross-Listings and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Gov-
ernance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1779–98 (2002) (discussing reasons for for-
eign firms cross-listing on a U.S. exchange). 
 69. See id. at 1800–28 (exploring competition among international ex-
changes). 
 70. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2012). 
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ulatory goals, in unintended and counterproductive ways. 
We’ve been here before: In 1993, the IRS adopted regulations 
limiting the tax deductibility of CEO salaries to $1 million, 
which was intended to stymie the growth in fixed executive 
compensation and encourage incentive-based compensation.71 
To regulators’ chagrin, however, the $1 million salary ceiling 
quickly became the salary floor, while bonus payments to CEOs 
took off via complex stock option plans and other devices. In-
stead of providing a fix, this exacerbated then-existing tensions 
and precipitated many of the problems we are trying to solve 
today.72 
Upon signing Dodd-Frank five years ago, President Obama 
expressed confidence that the Act would ensure that executives 
“are rewarded based on how well they perform, not how well 
they evade accountability.”73 Despite all the complex rules and 
over eleven thousand say-on-pay votes,74 we clearly are not 
there yet. Just ask the shareholders of CBS, Discovery Com-
munications, and Viacom, who collectively saw $22.7 billion of 
market capitalization evaporate in 2014, all while making eye-
wateringly high payments to their CEOs. This is not what pay 
for performance was supposed to look like.  
 
 
 71. See 26 U.S.C. § 162(m) (2012).  
 72. See, e.g., Steven A. Bank, Devaluing Reform: The Derivatives Market 
and Executive Compensation, 7 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 301, 332 (1995); see also 
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS 118–37 (2012) (discussing the effects of federal reforms aimed at ad-
dressing executive pay since the 1990s). 
 73. Remarks by the President at Signing of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Re-
form and Consumer Protection Act, WHITE HOUSE (July 21, 2010), https:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-signing-dodd-frank 
-wall-street-reform-and-consumer-protection-act. 
 74. See SEMLER BROSSY, supra note 12. 
